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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. CLAUDE A. CRAIG,
Appellant.
Homicide--Evidence.-The evidence in a murder case was not
consistent with defendant's argument that he had intervened
in an altercation between the deceased woman and a stranger,
that he had fallen or stumbled on decedent's body and had
thereby lost his hotel key, where he stated to other persons
about two or three hours after the crime that he had beaten
up a woman and that when he "hit them they stayed hit.''
[2a, 2b] Id.-Evidence.-The evidence in a murder case showed
only second degree murder where, though the killing was extremely brutal, there was nothing to indicate premeditation,
nothing to show that defendant had ever seen the victim before
she approached him at an intersection other than the statement
that he had "beaten up a woman," and nothing to show how
the killing was accomplished or that it was committed eithe.
in an attempt to commit rape or in the commission of rape,
and where nothing more was shown than the infliction of
multiple acts of violence on the victim.
[3] Id.-Murder in First Degree.-In order to prove defendant
guilty of first degree murder on the theory that it was committed in an attempt to commit rape or in the commission of
rape, it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that he had
the specific intent to commit rape.
[4] Id.-Evidence.-First degree murder on the theory that it was
committed in an attempt to commit rape or the commission of
rape was not shown by defendant's statements to a rehabilitation center attendant, several hours before commission of the
crime, that he wished he had a wife or girl and that he would
like a "little loving," nor by his obnoxious behavior in a dance
hall, shortly before the crime, when another woman refused to
dance with him; such evidence merely showed a desire for
feminine companionship.
[5] !d.-Presumptions-Malice.--When a killing is proved to have
been committed by defendant and nothing further is shown,
the presumption of law is that it was malicious and an act of
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide,§ 77; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 39.
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide,§§ 46, 51, 172; Am.Jur., Homicide,
§§ 304-, 307 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Homicide, ~ 145; [3] Homicide,
§ 15(6); [4] Homieide, § 145(:-3). [5] Humicide, ~ 5~; [6, 7] Homicid<", § 120; [8] Criminal Law, § 1404(15); [9] Criminal Law,
§ 236(5).
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murder; but the verdict should bo murder of the second degree, not murder of the first
!d.-Evidence--Condition of Deceased's Body.-Relevant evidence of the condition of the deceased's body is admissible in a
murder prosecution though it
be gruesome and
inflammatory, and cumulative
on the
proper.
[7] !d.-Evidence--Condition of Deceased's Body.-Evidence as to
the condition of deceased's
as shown
photographs,
was admissible in a murder prosecution as relevant to intent,
motive and the circumstances of the killing where the testimony was far from clear
the position of the body,
the cause and nature of some of the injuries, and whether or
not the body had been moved before or after death.
[8] Criminal Law-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting Attorney.-Though evidence of defendant's prior conviction of rape was admissible in a murder
prosecution and the jury was properly instructed as to the
sole purpose of its admission, repeated references by the district attorney, in his argument to the jury, to defendant as "the
convicted rapist" and as the "rapist" and as having been convicted of rape were prejudicial insofar as degree of the crime
was concerned, since they emphasized in the jurors' minds the
thought that defendant might be guilty of rape, and it was
doubtful whether an instruction that such argument was not
evidence in the case cured the error; but such error did not
require reversal where the conviction of first degree murder
was reduced to second degree murder.
[9J !d.-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity at Time of Trial.
-It was not an abuse of discretion to deny a motion by defense counsel, following a verdict of guilty in a murder case,
for a determination of the present sanity of defendant (Pen.
Code, § 1368), though such motion was supported by an affidavit setting forth the belligerent conduct of defendant when
a photographer tried to take his picture just prior to the
court's instruction to the jury, and setting forth irrational comments made by defendant that an insurance company was paying the district attorney money to convict him, that his ex-wife
had tipped off the insuranee company, that his step-daughter
had framed him, and the like, where the trial conrt observed
him in court and on the witness stand and was apparently of
the opinion that there was no doubt as to his present sanity.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239)
from a judgment of the City and County of San Francisco.
Walter Carpeneti, ,Judge. Judgment modified with directions.
[6) See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 218 et seq.; Am.Jur., Homicide,
§ 444 et seq.
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CAR'l'ER, J.-Defendant, Claude A. Craig, was found
guilty by a
of the first degree murder of Helen Ivy
and the punishment was fixed at death. On his plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity, the jury found him sane at the
time of the commission of the crime. Defendant's motion for
a new trial and for reduetion of the degree of the crime wa:s
denied. The appeal is automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239.)
On November 6, 1956, the defendant registered at the Civic
Center Hotel and occupied room number 537 to which he
was given a key with that number on it. He had come to San
Francisco from Fresno to receive medical treatnwnt for his
back which had been injured. On the morning of November
7th, defendant called at the May T. Morrison Rehabilitation
Center where he stated to an attendant that he wished he
were married and that he would like to have a girl because
he would "like to have a little loving." On the evening of
the 7th, defendant went to the Bohemian Gardens at 1600
Market Street, where several times, he asked a woman customer to dance with him. She refused and her last refusal
was met by a torrent of abusive language from the defendant
who called her a foul name and told her that if she did not
dance with him she would find herself picking herself up off
the sidewalk. While at the bar, defendant drank only beer
and apparently remained sober. The evidence is in conflict as
to just how many beers he drank-the patrons at the bar
claiming he had about three and defendant himself that he
had about 12. Defendant left the bar at about 2 a.m. with
one Russell Martin with whom he walked up Market Street
for about 20 or 30 feet. They then retraced their steps and
crossed over to Franklin Street. Near the intersection of

0.2d

As Martin was
woman, later identified as
the
Helen Ivy,
Martin then apparently
walked up Lily Street, or alley, in the direction from which
the victim had come. Martin left the defendant standing
at the Franklin-Lily intersection.
The
of Miss
7 o'clock on the
wheels of which
were jacked, or
up, in a service station at the corner
of
and Franklin Streets
across from the Bohemian Gardens. She had
been dragged some
20-25 feet and the car under which t;h(> was lying and the
one next to it were
with blood. Miss Ivy was
wearing a raincoat over a
or slip and panties.
The raincoat had been
the nightgown or slip
and the panties were torn open so that the front part of the
body was exposed. She was lying on her back with her legs
spread slightly apart. Her panties which had been torn open
in the front were under her; her arms were in the sleeves of
the coat. The victim had suffered multiple contusions and
lacerations of the face, both breasts, and of the area around
the breasts. She bad contusions or bruises of the neck with
depressions in the skin. The skin of the lower abdominal area
showed lacerations and there was a scuffing of the skin of the
entire abdomen. The medical testimony shows that the "scuffing" was probably the result of the body having been dragged
across asphalt. Heel marks were found on the woman's midchest area and others on the lower abdominal area. There
were four such heel marks. The autopsy revealed a hemorrhage into the neck mnsclcR. fractured ribs on both sides; a
lacerated lung, ruptured liver and subarachnoid hemorrhage
of the brain. The record shows that the medical testimony
was to the effect that although she could have died of the
injuries to the brain, lungs or liver, her death was probably
the result of strangulation around the neck. It was estimated that it would have taken from 20 to 80 blows to inflict
the injuries. A key to defendant's hotel room was found
lodged in a fold of the clothing of the victim between her
left arm and side.
Defendant, who appeared to be under the influence of
alcohol, was next seen about 4 :50 a.m. on November 8th at
the office of the California State Railroad at Pier 27 in San
Francisco. His hands were bloody, blood was spattered on his
hat, coat, the bottom of his levi pants, and his face. When
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asked
one of the workmen at the
what had happened
to his hand which was
and covered with blood, the defendant
that "I beat up a woman" and that when he
hit them "they
hit." The record shows that defendant
returned to his hotel between 7 and 9 o'clock on the morning
of the 8th without his hotel
which he said he had left
in a
Defendant took off his coat and hat at the
hung
them on a nail and left them there. The blood on them was
found to be
A
matched that of the
victim.
At 9 :45 on the morning of the 8th, defendant was at the
Morrison Rehabilitation Center in an extremely agitated
condition. His right hand was swollen and skinned as a
result, he stated to an attendant, of a fall the preceding night.
Defendant asked the attendant if she had read about the
murder of a "fiuzzy" blonde in an alley the night before.*
Defendant was arrested at 3 o'clock on the afternoon of
the 8th. His right hand at that time was swollen and skinned,
his right shoulder was bruised, his left knee was black and
blue. In his hotel room, police found the shirt he had worn
the previous night. It contained Type A blood. There was
also blood on defendant's shoes, the heels of which corresponded with the heel prints on the victim's body. There were no
blood smears on the fly, back or top of defendant's shorts
or levis. No evidence of a sexual attack was found on the
body of the decedent; no evidence of semen or spermatazoa
was found on either the clothing of the decedent or the defendant.
Defendant testified that he could not remember the events
of the night of the crime; that he had been taking pills which
he had bought without a prescription for the pain in his back
caused by an injury he had previously suffered; that he didn't
know how much he had to drink but that he drank only beer
and that he had always been a "heavy drinker" when he once
started. He also said he had been taking "medical shots" in
Fresno to keep from going insane. The medical testimony
showed that defendant was an emotionally unstable person;
that he had had at least one period where he couldn't remember where he had been or what he had done; that he had
difficulty in making decisions.
*The San Francisco Examiner and the Chronicle did not carry the
story of the murder that morning, and the San Francisco News and
Call-Bulletin issues which carried the first account of the crime were
not on the streets until after 10 o'clock.
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is consistent with
that he had intervened in an altercation between the decedent
and a stranger, that he had fallen or stumbled on the decedent's body and had thereby lost his hotel
In view
of the defendant's statements to the
workers that he
had beaten up a woman and that when he "hit them they
stayed hit" this
is
without merit.
[2a] The second contention is that the
as a matter
of law, shows only second degree murder. This contention is
meritorious. The record shows a killing accomplished with
great brutality, but does not show any premeditation. There
is nothing to show that the defendant had ever seen the
victim before she approached him where he was standing at
the intersection of li'ranldin and Lily Streets other than the
statement that he had "beaten up a woman"; neither is there
anything to show how the killing was accomplished. It appears that the only other theory on which the jury could have
found the defendant guilty of first degree murder was that it
had been perpetrated in the commission of rape, or the attempt to commit rape. The People contend that the torn
clothing, the position of the victim's legs, and defendant's
abusive conduct toward the woman who refused to dance
with him as well as the statement made to the attendant at the
Rehabilitation Center that he wanted a girl and that he would
like "some loving" all tend to prove that the defendant either
raped, or attempted to rape, his victim. It will be recalled
that there was no other evidence to this effect-neither the
defendant's, nor the victim's clothing bore any evidence of
the sexual act. [3] In order to prove the defendant guilty of
first degree murder on the theory that it was committed in an
attempt to commit rape, or the commission of rape, it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that he had the specific
intent to commit rape. (Pearle v. Cheary, 48 Cal.2d 301,
308 f309 P.2d 431] .) There was here, as distinguished from
the Cheary case, no blood on defendant's trousers. other than
at the cuff, and no blood on either the fly of his levis or shorts.
Since other articles of defendant's wearing apparel were well
spattered with blood and his hands cov;->rrd therewith, it would
appear that had he raped the d0ceased, or attempt<?d to do so.
the levis and shorts would have shown
of blood. 'rhere
is also a complete absence of any evidenc? in the record to
show that he had an intent to commit rape. The record shows
that the condition of the woman's clothing and her size when
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would tend to indicate a terrific struggle during
which he had held her
the front part of her coat and other
the position of the victim's legs would tend to
prove that rape had been eommitted rather than that defendant intendeil to commit rape, and of this there was absolutely
no evidence.
the
of the
loses
had been dragged
some 20 to 25 feet.
His statements to the Rehabilitation
Center attendant that he wished he had a wife, or girl, and
that he would like a 'little
' and his obnoxious behavior in the Bohemian Gardens when the woman refused to
dance with him do not tend to show an intent to commit rape
but show, merely, as the People admit, a desire for feminine
[5] "When the killing is proved to have
been committed
the defendant, and nothing further is
the prewmption of law is that it was malicious and an
act of murder; but in such a (~ase the verdict should be murder
of the second degree, and not murder of the first degree."
(People v. Howm·d (1930), 211 Cal. 322, 329 [295 P. 333, 71
A.I.1.R. 1385]; People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 179 [163 P.2d
8].) [2b] It appears that in the case at bar there is a
total lack of satisfactory evidence that the killing was committed either in the attempt to commit rape or in the commission of rape; that the evidence shows no more than the infliction of multiple acts of violence on the victim and that
even though the killing was an extremely brutal one the People
have proved only that the defendant was guilty of second
degree murder (People v. Caldwell, 43 Cal.2d 864, 869 [279
P.2d 539] ).
[6] There was no error in the admission of the pictures of
the deceased. In this case the pictures were clearly relevant
to aid the jury in its determinations and attempt to reconstruct the crime. As we said in People v. Reese, 47 Cal.2d 112,
120 [ 301 P.2d 582], "Relevant evidence of the condition of
the deceased's body is wlmissible although it may be gruesome
and possibly inflammatory. (People v. Isby, 30 Cal.2d 879
[186 P.2d 405]; People v. Guldbrandsen, 35 Cal.2d 514 [218
P.2d 977] ; People v. Dunn, 29 Cal.2d 654 [177 P.2d 553) ;
People v. Burwell, 44 Cal.2d 16 [279 P.2d 744]; People v.
Cavanaugh, 44 Cal.2d 252 [282 P.2d 53] ; People v. Sutic, 41
Cal.2d 483 [261 P.2d 241] .) And cumulative evidence on the
subject may be proper (People v. Dunn, supra, 29 Cal.2d
654, 659; People v. Reed, 38 Cal.2d 423 [240 P.2d 590].)

C.2d

Here the evidence was
avd the circumstances
the
added appreciably to the other evidence to the same effect."
(Emphasis added.) In the ease at bar, the above quoted and
emphasized sentence is particularly pertinent since the testimony was far from clear concerning the position of the body,
the cause and nature of some of the
and whether
or not the body had been moved before or after death.
[8] Defendant contends that the district attorney was
guilty of prejudicial misconduct in his argument to the jury.
It is admitted that evidence of the defendant's prior conviction for rape was admissible and that the jury was properly
instructed as to the sole purpose for its admission. It is
claimed, however, that the repeated references to the conviction constituted prejudicial error. The record discloses that
the district attorney referred to the defendant as "the convicted rapist" and as the "rapist" as well as referring to
the defendant's conviction for rape some six times during his
argument to the jury. In a car:e such as the one at bar, it
would appear that these references were prejudicial insofar
as the degree of the crime is concerned since it emphasized
in the jurors' minds the thought that defendant might be
guilty of rape. Defense counsel, however, objected only once
and his objection then was to the effect that the prior conviction had "been argued many a time." Although the jury
was instructed that argument of counsel was not evidence in
the case, it is doubtful that the instruction cured the error.
It is our opinion that the error here was so prejudicial as to
constitute a miscarriage of justice within the rule announced
by this court in People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299
P.2d 243]. However, since the error affected only the degree
of the crime, it does not require a reversal where the degree
is reduced to that shown by the evidence. Inasmuch as defendant's conviction of first degree murder rests entirely on
the assumption that he either raped, or intended to rape, his
victim it is apparent that the references to him as a "rapist"
probably constituted the turning point in the deliberation of
the jury.
INSANITY TRIAL

[9] After the verdict had been returned by the jury on
defendant's plea of not guilty, defense counsel moved for a
determination of the present sanity of the defendant. (Pen.
Code, § 1368.) This motion was denied and defendant claims
that the trial oourt was guilty of an abuse of discretion in
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the denial of his motion. The motion was supported by the
affidavit of defense counsel (the deputy public defender)
in which he sets l'orth the belligerent conduct of the defendant
when a photographer tried to take his picture just prior to
the court's instruction of the jury. At that time defendant
attackefl newsmen, eourt attaches and a policeman and was
restrained by handcuffing him throughout the instruction
of the
The affidavit also sets forth irrational comments
made by the defendant some of which were to the effect that
an insurance company was paying the district attorney some
one or three thousand dollars to convict him; that his ex-wife
had tipped off the insurance company; that his step-daughter
had framed him. It is also averred that while the jury was
being instructed, defendant made the following statements
to the jury: "Give me the death penalty"; "I am not guilty.
but give me the death penalty''; ''The insurance company
has bought off the ,jury just like they have homicide." That
other statements made by the defendant were: ''Take me back
to jail. I don't like these people''; ''Where are my socks.
There is no blood on them'' ; ''Why are they charging me
with robbery¥ Someone must have robbed me'' ; ''The walls
are closing in. l\fy head is only this big." (Indicating a small
circle with his thumb and forefinger.) He also made statements to the effect that his "brain was numb" and his ears
were "hot."
While the above statements taken out of context would
tend to show that the defendant was mentally deranged, a
reading of the record as a whole discloses no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying the motion.
Although at times the defendant was profane, belligerent, and
most uncooperative, the trial court observed him in court
and on the witness stand and was, apparently, of the opinion
that there was no doubt as to his present sanity.
The judgment of the trial court of first degree murder is
modified and the cause remanded to the trial court with
directions to enter judgment against defendant finding him
guilty of second degree murder and thereupon to pronounce
judgment upon him as prescribed by law.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
SPENCE, J.-I dissent.
A reading of the record leaves no doubt that defendant
killed Helen Ivy and the majority concedes that "the killing
49 C.2d-11
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brutal one.'' The
reaches the
that "there is a total lack
satisfactory
evidence that the killing was committed . . . in the attempt
to commit rape. . .. " I cannot agree with that conclusion.
In my opinion, there was substantial evidence to show that
the murder was committed in an attempt to commit rape.
(People v.
48 Cal.2d
546-547 [310 P.2d 969] ;
People v. Rupp, 41 Cal.2d
378 [260 P.2d 1]; People v.
Gutierrez, 35 CaL2d
726-727
P.2d 22]; People v.
Lindley, 26 Cal.2d 780, 792 [161 P.2d 227].) I find no
prejudicial error in the record and would therefore affirm
the judgment.
Shenk, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied November 26, 1957. Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J.,
were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

[L. A. No. 24090.
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ALICE F. ROZAN, Respondent, v. MAXWELL M. ROZAN,
Appellant.
[1] Oonil.ict of Laws-Personal Property.-Marital interests in

movables acquired during coverture are governed by the law
of the domicile at the time of their acquisition.
[2] !d.-Personal Property.-The interests of spouses in movables
do not change though the movables are taken into another
state or are used to purchase land in another state.
[3] Divorce-Evidence-Residence.-A finding in a divorce action
that the spouses established their residence in the state not
later than July of 1948 was sustained by evidence that they
resided in another state until May of that year; by the wife's
testimony that, after learning she was pregnant, they decided
[1] See Oa.l.Jur.2d, Conflict of Laws, § 40 et seq.; Am.Jur., Conflict of Laws, § 65 et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 66; Am.Jur.,
Divorce and Separation, § 248.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Conflict of Laws,§ 18; [3) Divorce,
§ 101; [4, 5, 9, 10] Husband and Wife, § 200; [6] Husband and
Wife, § 48; [7] Husband and Wife, § 69; [8] Divorce, § 234(2);
[11) Courts,§ 26; [12] Equity,§ 7; [13] Judgments,§ 474; (14, 15]
Divorce, § 132.

